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Abstract

In August 2007, Fortis Group, Belgium’s largest bank, acquired the Dutch operations of ABN
AMRO, becoming the fifth largest bank in Europe. Despite its size and its significant
operations in the Benelux countries, Fortis struggled to integrate ABN AMRO. Fortis’s
situation worsened with the crash of the US subprime market, which impacted its subprime
mortgage portfolio. By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, its stock had lost 70% of
its value, and it was on the verge of collapse due to a severe liquidity crisis. The governments
of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands quickly came together and agreed to inject
funding into the bank to keep it afloat. However, the deal fell apart when the Netherlands
reversed course and nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets. As a result, Fortis underwent an
uncoordinated resolution, bifurcated along national lines. This case permits examination of
this attempt at a cross-border rescue of a failing, systemically important financial institution,
analysis of why the effort failed, and consideration of how it might proceed differently under
current regulations.

_____________________________________________________________________
1 This module is one of four produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) considering the
European Banking Union. Other modules are:
• European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism
• European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism
• European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises.
2
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1. Introduction
On October 17, 2007, Fortis SA/NV(Fortis), Belgium’s largest bank, partnered with the Royal
Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander in a €72 billion deal to purchase ABN AMRO, a large
but troubled Dutch bank. As a result, Fortis took over the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO
and was transformed into Europe’s fifth-largest bank with a strong presence in the Benelux
countries (i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It was widely thought that the
three banks overpaid for ABN AMRO, and Fortis soon began to struggle from the effects of
the acquisition on its balance sheet. Its troubles were exacerbated as its mortgage portfolio
was impacted by the crash of the US subprime market.

By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, and its stock had lost 70% of its value. By
September of 2008, the bank was on the verge of collapse as it experienced a severe liquidity
crisis. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands came together and
agreed to inject €11.2 billion into the bank. However, the deal fell apart when the
Netherlands suddenly reversed course and nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets. As a result,
Fortis underwent an uncoordinated resolution along national lines, with the Belgian and
Luxembourg governments pursuing different strategies than the Dutch government.
In this module, readers will examine the attempted cross-border resolution of Fortis.
Readers should seek to identify weaknesses in the effort that might be avoided or minimized
so as to achieve a more effective, coordinated result in the future. They should also seek to
identify incentives that might strengthen cross-border resolution cooperation.

The rest of this module is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the Fortis
Group. Section 3 discusses the ABN AMRO acquisition. Section 4 describes the difficulty that
Fortis had in integrating the ABN AMRO assets. Section 5 describes the joint resolution
attempt and its dissolution. Section 6 concerns the regulatory reviews and events that
occurred after the first resolution attempt, and Section 7 introduces some conclusions about
what has been learned from the Fortis situation.
Questions

1. Should the Dutch, Belgian, and/or Luxembourg governments have done more to
prevent or delay the acquisition of ABN AMRO, given the economic climate? What
type of tools would they have needed?

2. Could the new European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SRM) have prevented the
Fortis collapse?
3. What prompted the different responses from the Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg
governments?
4. Did the governments act purely out of self-interest? Did they comply with the letter
and spirit of European Union (EU) law?

5. What were the different strategies used by the Belgian and Dutch governments, and
their results for depositors, counter-parties, shareholders, and taxpayers?
6. How do these results compare to what might have been achieved through a
coordinated resolution under the new SRM?
7. Would the SRM have resulted in a more effective or simpler resolution?
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8. What were the roles of the European Central Bank and the European Commission in
the resolution?

2. History of Fortis

The Fortis Group was created in 1990 when AMEV, a large Dutch insurer merged with VSB
Group, a Dutch banking group, and then later that same year joined with AG Group, a Belgian
insurer. The resulting company operated in both Belgium and the Netherlands through a
complicated holding company structure and various subsidiaries. The transaction was the
first cross-border merger in the European financial services industry and was heralded as a
realization of the EU single market. In the following years, Fortis grew organically and
through a series of aggressive acquisitions.

Beginning in 1998, Fortis’s two parent companies adopted identical management structures
in an effort to better unify the company. Several additional initiatives were taken in the
following years, including the switch to a single Board of Directors in September 2000, 5 the
launch in December 2001 of the single Fortis share—a new financial instrument that
combined the shares of the two parent companies 6—and in 2004, the amendment of the two
parent companies’ Articles of Association in order to create a more internationally oriented
Board of Directors headed by a single Chairman (Fortis 2006, 247).

By 2006, Fortis operated as a unified multinational business. However, its two parent
companies, Fortis SA/NV (Belgium) and Fortis N.V. (the Netherlands), retained their
independent status. Each was separately registered in its home country and prepared its
own financial statement in accordance with the legal and regulatory requirements of its
home country. Together, the group also published a consolidated financial statement as
required by Belgian law and a joint report of the Board of Directors of both parent
companies. (See Figures 1 and 2 for more detail regarding Fortis’s governance structure.)

_____________________________________________________________________
5 “The governance

structure of Fortis is such that a Fortis Board meeting is always a ‘two-in-one’ event. Anyone
observing such a meeting would see Board members participating in a single meeting to discuss issues and take
decisions that relate to Fortis. From a legal point of view, however, two meetings have taken place” (Fortis
Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 9).
“When purchasing a Fortis share, shareholders effectively acquire a unit that comprises one ordinary Fortis
SA/NA share and one ordinary Fortis N.V. share. As a consequence of this ‘Twinned Share Principle,’ the
number of Fortis Shares issued is always equal to the number of Fortis SA/NV shares issued and also the
number of Fortis N.V. shares issued. The Twinned Share Principle of Fortis is truly unique. It implies that a
single unit represents a share in two legal entities, each with a different nationality. Shareholders have voting
rights in both parent companies and may choose to receive a wholly Belgian-sourced or a wholly Dutch-sourced
dividend” (Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 13).
6
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Figure 1: Fortis Parent Structure

Source: Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 9.

Aggressive Growth
The Benelux countries were Fortis’s home base and its strongest markets. However by 2007,
Fortis had grown its business to operate in over 50 countries with almost 57,000 employees.
Fortis operated in two segments: banking and insurance.
Figure 2: Fortis Substructure

Source: Fortis Governance Statement, English Version, January 2008, 10.

Fortis’s banking operations included retail banking, offering a variety of deposit, credit, and
investment financial services to individuals and small businesses. Fortis also offered
merchant and private banking services to a variety of clients, including large international
companies, medium-sized enterprises, public sector entities, and high-net-worth
individuals.

Fortis’s insurance business offered a variety of products, including life, healthcare, and
disability insurance products, as well as mortgage and savings instruments. Besides
branches of Fortis Bank, the company sold these products through a variety of channels, such
as independent agents, brokers, and financial planners (Fortis 2006, 111-112).
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As shown in Figure 3, in 2007, after the ABN AMRO acquisition, Fortis reported $121 billion
in revenue and a record $5.5 billion profit, on assets of $1 trillion.
Regulation and Supervision

Fortis was subject to regulatory supervision at the consolidated level and at the individual
operating company level. At the consolidated level, the Belgian Banking, Finance, and
Insurance Commission and De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank [DCB])
supervised Fortis jointly. Since its banking activities, headquartered in Brussels, were the
largest part of the organization, the Belgian authority was considered the “consolidating and
coordinating supervisor” (primary) for EU purposes. Fortis’s banking subsidiaries had to
comply with the regulations in the countries where they operated (Fortis 2006, 87). The
group was listed on the Euronext Brussels, Euronext Amsterdam, and Luxembourg stock
exchanges and had a sponsored ADR program in the United States.

Later, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would find that “Fortis was deemed to
be systemically relevant in the three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg),
not only because of its large positions in domestic markets, but also because of its function
as a clearing member at several major domestic and foreign stock exchanges” (Basel
Committee 2010, 16). As shown in Figure 4, the size of Fortis’ balance sheet exceeded that of
Belgium and the Netherlands, which would prove challenging when the bank needed
assistance.
Figure 3: Fortis Key Indicators 2005-08
Year

Revenues*

Profits
(After tax)*

Profits/
Revenues

Assets*

Common
Equity*

Equity as %
assets

Employees

2005

75,518

4,177

5.5%

775,636

19,525

2.5

50,846

2006

112,351

4,896

4.4%

859,900

22,328

2.6

54,245

2007

121,202

5,459

4.5%

1,022,256

27,222

2.7

56,886

2008

164,887

5,467

3.3%

1,273,717

48,317

3.8

62,009

*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Source: Fortune Global 500 available at

http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/snapshots/532.html.

Figure 4: Fortis Group Assets vs. Belgium and The Netherlands GDPs 2005-08
Year

Assets*

Assets as % of Belgium GDP

Assets as % of Netherlands GDP

2005

775,636

252

145

2006

859,900

212

125

2007

1,022,256

190

112

2008

1,273,717

285

166

*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Source: Fortune Global 500 available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/snapshots/532.html.
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3. The ABN AMRO Acquisition
In October 2007, Fortis acquired the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO, the second-largest
Dutch bank, as part of a three-party consortium that included the Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS), as lead, and the Banco Santander (Spain) (See Fortis, RBS and Santander 2007 for the
offer details). At the time, ABN AMRO was listed in the Fortune Global 500 as the 15th largest
bank in the world. ABN AMRO had operations in 63 countries and 110,000 employees.

The bid by the consortium was a hostile one. The ABN AMRO board had preferred an offer
by Barclays, largely because of Barclays’s intent to maintain most of the bank intact. The
Barclays offer also was surprisingly favored by the Dutch Central Bank, according to press
reports in February of 2007 (See Treanor 2007). Just as Barclay’s exclusive period expired,
the consortium made a higher bid but proposed breaking up the bank. The consortium’s bid
was favored by The Children’s Investment Fund Management (TCI) hedge fund, a major ABN
AMRO shareholder. With TCI’s support, the consortium secured a favorable vote at the
shareholders’ meeting.
Figure 5: The Acquisition of ABN AMRO
Entity

Royal Bank of Scotland

Fortis Group

Banco Santander

Investment

€27.2 billion

€24 billion

€19.9 billion

Businesses
Acquired

North American
operations + global
warehouse customers

Dutch operations, including the private
banking and asset management functions +
commercial and mortgage loan divisions.

Latin American and
Southern Europe
operations

United Kingdom

Belgium/the Netherlands

Spain

Bank of England

Belgian Banking, Finance, and Insurance
Commission, Dutch Ministry of Finance +
Dutch Central Bank

Bank of Spain

Home
Country
Supervisor

Source: Algemene Rekenkamer 2009-10.

In the end, the Consortium bid €71 billion for ABN AMRO, an amount that many analysts
believed was too high (See Figure 5).

Fortis put up €24 billion (cash). The bank financed its participation “through the issuance of
new shares, convertible bonds, hybrid instruments, divestment and capital relief
transactions (securitizations)… In addition, it arranged a borrowing facility of €10 billion as
bridging financing” (DCB, Fortis Letter, 5). In exchange, Fortis took over ABN AMRO’s Dutch
operations, including the private banking and asset management functions, strengthening
its position in those markets. Fortis also acquired the commercial loan and mortgage loan
divisions.
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Approval by the Dutch Authorities
Because the proposed transaction would combine the first and fourth largest banks in the
Dutch commercial banking market, it was subject to review and approval by the DCB, which
was also the bank supervisor, and the Dutch Ministry of Finance. Both Fortis N.V.
(Netherlands) and ABN AMRO were of vital importance to the Dutch financial sector because
of their size, the nature of their activities, and their roles in the interbank market and
payments.

The DCB found that problems at either or both institutions could have generated systemwide effects, and that those effects could be intensified with the consolidation of the two
entities. 7 The DCB also found that the intended two-to-three-year timeframe for splitting up
ABN AMRO created the risk that conflicts of interest could develop between the parties,
causing further stress to the financial industry. The DCB also took special note of the looming
financial crisis and liquidity problems then being experienced by banks that might negatively
impact any or all of the involved banks and found that the transaction “could jeopardize the
financial stability of the nation’s financial sector” (See Appendix A for the DCB’s analysis of
systemic risk.).

However, despite its finding of jeopardy, ultimately, the DCB found no legal basis for halting
the deal. Rather, to mitigate the identified risks, the DCB imposed a number of conditions on
the consortium. 8 On September 17, 2007, it advised the Ministry of Finance to issue a
declaration of no-objection for the proposed transaction, subject to its stated conditions. The
Ministry issued a declaration of no-objection the same day (For further details see the DCB
Fortis Letter and the DCB RBS/Santander Letter). 9
European Commission Approval

The merger was also required to pass scrutiny under EU merger regulations. Upon review,
the European Commission concluded that the acquisition of assets by RBS and Santander
would not impede effective competition in the European Economic Area. However, the
Commission concluded that the acquisition by Fortis presented competitive issues regarding
the concentration in commercial banking. The Commission required Fortis to divest certain
of its commercial banking units before proceeding with the deal. Fortis sold these units at a
€300 million loss (European Commission, IP/07/1442).

_____________________________________________________________________
“From a prudential point of view, an offer by a consortium would constitute a strong risk-increasing and
complicating factor, both in the preparation of the transaction and in its execution and implementation”
Treanor 2007.
7

For example, the Consortium was required to submit a transition plan for approval within 45 days after the
deal closed DCB RBS/Santander letter, Annex, 2.

8

9 The UK Financial Services Authority was also criticized for not taking steps to halt the “calamitous” deal which

amounted to €27.2 billion on The Royal Bank of Scotland’s part. It was later determined that the deal reduced
RBS’s capital cushion to just 2%, which precipitated its failure as the financial crisis developed. It had to be
rescued by the UK government beginning in October 2008. As of year-end 2013, the government had invested
£45.5 billion (€27.2 billion) and still owned 79% (Herald Scotland, October 2012; www.rbs.com). Additionally,
in 2013, the FSA was terminated as a separate agency.
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4. A Difficult Integration
Soon after the acquisition, Fortis began to struggle. The bank delayed fully integrating ABN
AMRO assets for several reasons. First, it had acquired a great amount of intangibles that it
could not put on its balance sheet and would have to write off. Second, if it fully integrated
ABN AMRO, it would be in danger of no longer satisfying its capital requirements.
Additionally, it had to contend with the €300 million loss from the EU-required sale of assets
that it had to recognize. Fortis’s troubles were exacerbated as its subprime mortgage
portfolio was being impacted by the crash of the US subprime market.

To finance the purchase, Fortis raised €13.4 billion in October 2007 by issuing extra shares
to existing shareholders at a discounted price of €15 per share. In November 2007, Fortis
reported an unexpected decline in third-quarter profits and disclosed that it had “some
exposure” to the US subprime market through its holdings of mortgage-backed and assetbacked securities and collateralized debt securities. Despite this, it managed to sell an
additional €2.5 billion in bonds to help fund the ABN AMRO acquisition.
However, Fortis’s situation had weakened by June 2008. The bank announced that because
of the financial crisis it needed to fortify its capital by raising an additional €8.3 billion and
paying its much coveted dividend in stock instead of cash (saving €1.5 billion). The move
caused an uproar among shareholders because the dividend had been one of the main selling
points of the shares. Fortis stock dropped from €12 to €10 on June 26, 2008, and then further
declined.
On June 26, 2008, Standard & Poor’s put the company on “credit watch with negative
implications” citing the bank’s “increasing reliance on weaker forms of capital” (The New
York Times, 2008A). After further review, on July 17, it lowered the ratings on Fortis’ core
operating groups and subsidiaries (Reuters, 2008).

The company finally managed to issue 150 million shares to large investors at €10 a share,
placing them with Libyan and Chinese investors after giving a 25% discount. Belgian
shareholders (holding a combined total of 15 percent) were not allowed to participate, a
situation that was not well-received.

Despite further attempts to calm the waters, on July 11, 2008, Fortis CEO, Jean-Paul Votron
stepped down, conceding that the ABN AMRO acquisition had depleted Fortis’s capital. 10 Its
stock closed at just half of what it had been prior to the acquisition.

During the summer, customers continued to withdraw funds, and Fortis experienced a
worsening liquidity crisis. By September 2008, Fortis was on the verge of collapse and the
subject of bankruptcy rumors, no doubt fueled by the September 14 run on Northern Rock
UK plc (the UK’s first bank run in 150 years) and the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers
in the US the next day. 11 During the last week of September, Fortis’ share price fell 35%, to
_____________________________________________________________________

10 Fortis was led by a number of CEOs from 2000-08, which led to a lack of leadership continuity. Anton van
Rossum joined Fortis as CEO in 2000. Jean-Paul Votron replaced him in 2004 and engineered the company’s
purchase of ABN AMRO, a company at which he had briefly worked. Votron resigned in July 2008 after the
company’s stock had lost 70% of its value during the year. He was succeeded by an interim CEO, Harman
Verwilst, who had been with the company since 2004. Filip Dierckx, who had been responsible for growing
Fortis’ subprime mortgage business then replaced Verwilst in July 2008.

See YPFS case module, Wiggins, et al. 2014H for a discussion of how incidents in one financial market impact
those in other countries.

11
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hover around €5. On September 25, CEO Harman Verwilst tried to reassure analysts that the
company was sound, but without offering concrete numbers, he had little impact. He stepped
down that evening and was replaced by Fillip Dierckx.

5. The Resolution Attempt

On Sunday, September 28, 2008, DCB Chief Nout Wellink and Dutch Finance Minister Wouter
Bos travelled to Brussels for talks with the Belgian government and regulators. The two
Dutch officials had not considered the meeting a formal get-together but wanted to meet
with the Belgians about the problems that Fortis was having and to consider solutions.
Although ING and BNP Paribas had expressed interest in buying the group, no concrete offer
had been made.
When Wellink and Bos arrived at the offices of the Belgian minister, to their surprise, there
was a “war council” in progress. Present were: Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme, Belgian
Finance Minister Didier Reynders, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde, European
Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, Fortis CEO Dierckx and two Fortis directors. The
talks were well underway, and specific numbers were being discussed (De Standaard 2008).

The three governments worked out an emergency plan to save Fortis by partially
nationalizing it, agreeing to inject €11.2 billion into the failing bank. As detailed in Figure 6,
Belgium would pay €4.7 billion for 49% of the Belgian holding company, which was the
parent of the Belgian bank and the profitable insurance subsidiary. Luxembourg would pay
€2.5 billion for 49% of the Luxembourg banking subsidiary. And the Netherlands would
contribute €4 billion for a 49% interest in the Dutch banking subsidiary (See The Telegraph,
dated September 28, 2008.).
Figure 6: Fortis Resolution Plan I (September 28, 2008)
Country

Investment
Interests
Acquired

Supervisor

Belgium

the Netherlands

Luxembourg

€4.7 billion

€4 billion

€2.5 billion

49% of Belgian holding
company including
Belgian bank and
insurance businesses

Belgian Banking, Finance
and Insurance
Commission

49% of Dutch
banking subsidiary
De Nederlandsche
Bank

49% of
Luxembourg
banking subsidiary
Central Bank of
Luxembourg

The Dutch Reversal
Upon returning home, the Dutch officials grew upset with not having been invited to the
meeting and with the deal that they had made. They believed that the Belgians were getting
a better deal, since they would acquire ownership of the lucrative Belgian and Dutch
insurance subsidiaries. As a result, the Dutch decided to pursue a different strategy.
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On October 3, the Dutch government announced that it had nationalized Fortis’s Dutch assets
in order to reassure Dutch depositors and safeguard the country’s financial market. The
government acquired a 92.6% interest in Fortis Bank Nederland Holding, a 100% interest in
Fortis Insurance Netherlands N.V., a 100% interest in Fortis Corporate Insurance, and a 70%
interest in Fortis FBN (H) Preferred Investments BV, paying €16.8 billion for these shares
(New York Times 2008). The Dutch government also repaid €34 billion in short-term loans
to Belgian Fortis and accepted liability for €16.1 billion of outstanding long-term loans. 12
Reports indicated that the Netherlands’ government never paid its original commitment, and
some critics felt that this had contributed to Fortis’s continuing troubles, as it had
experienced depositors’ withdrawals and lenders unwilling to lend even after the announced
plan (See the DCB Press Release).
The Belgian and Luxembourg Response

In light of the actions of the Dutch government and to stave off a run on Belgian Fortis, the
Belgian and Luxembourg governments scrambled to regroup. Two days later, on October 5,
2008, they announced the following “Additional Measures,” amounting to a revamped rescue
plan:
•

•

•
•

•

For an additional capital injection of €4.7 billion, the Belgian government would
acquire additional shares of Fortis Banque Belgium, bringing its total interest to
99.93%.
The Belgian government also agreed to transfer 75% of its interest in the Fortis
Belgian bank and 67% of the Luxembourg bank to the French bank BNP Paribas for
€8.25 billion in stock, which was later renegotiated to €11 billion. As a result, it
retained a 25% interest in Fortis Bank (sufficient to block shareholder action) and
became a 12% shareholder in BNP Paribas, making the Belgian government its largest
shareholder.
The Luxembourg government would acquire a 1.1% share in BNP Paribas.

Since BNP Paribas insisted that it would not take on Fortis’s toxic assets, a portfolio
of these assets, valued at €10 billion, would be transferred to a special-purpose
vehicle that would be owned and financed by the Belgian government (24%), BNP
Paribas (10%) and by Fortis Group, which held the ABN AMRO assets (66%).
BNP Paribas would purchase the Belgian insurance activities of the Fortis Group.

The Fortis Group would continue to own Fortis Insurance International and 66% of the
structured products vehicle, and it would also benefit from the sale of Fortis Insurance
Netherlands and Fortis insurance Belgium (Belgium Government, 2008).

6. The Aftermath and EU State Aid Review
EU State Aid Review

_____________________________________________________________________
In December 2008, the Dutch government also acquired a 33.8% interest in the ABN AMRO assets acquired
by the Fortis Group as a result of the Consortium purchase for an additional €6.54 billion. The government
also provided ongoing treasury financing, up to €45 billion, to the Dutch Fortis operations, a function that
Belgian Fortis had previously served (Algemene Rekenkamer, 6).

12
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Under the laws of the EU, the governments of the member states are prohibited from
injecting funds into private companies so as to give them an unfair advantage. However, the
laws do recognize that some government assistance may be necessary, and such “state aid”
is permitted for reasons of general economic development, subject to EU review.

In reviewing the Fortis situation, the EU Commission found that the actions by the Belgian
and Luxembourg governments in intervening to support Fortis constituted state aid to the
benefit of Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg. However, the Commission concluded
that the aid was compatible with EU laws because it was necessary to save the banks and to
remedy a threat to the financial system—“Given Fortis Bank’s size, market share in the retail
sector, and the prevailing crisis on the financial markets, the bank’s collapse would have
given rise to a systemic risk to the financial sector” (European Commission (IP/08/1884).
The Commission approved the Belgium/Luxembourg support package on December 3, 2008,
also finding that the sale to BNP Paribas did not involve state aid since it paid a market price.
Review by Belgian Court

Shortly after the resolution plans were announced, Belgian shareholders of Fortis Group
sued to stop the sale to BNP Paribas. On December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeal of Brussels
decided that the sales to the Dutch and Belgian governments, as well as the subsequent
agreement to sell to BNP Paribas, were not valid under Belgian law because they had not
been submitted to the Fortis shareholders. 13 This left the deal open to renegotiation. The
shareholders initially rejected the resolution plans at meetings in Belgium and the
Netherlands, but after certain transactions were changed, the plans were approved at a
second general assembly of shareholders held on March 12, 2009.

_____________________________________________________________________
It is worth noting that the Belgian government opposed the ruling, and a controversy ensued when certain
persons attempted to influence the court’s ruling and also to circumnavigate the ruling’s effect. In the country’s
climate of political turbulence (which had already been agitated by the Dutch nationalization of part of Fortis),
charges of interfering with the judiciary were brought, an investigation was undertaken, and ultimately the
Minister of Justice, Prime Minister Leterme, and the government resigned over the Fortis affair (Blenkinsop
2008).
13
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Figure 7: Fortis Resolution Plan II as of October 5, 2008*
Entity

the Netherlands

Investment

Interests
Acquired

Special
Purpose
Vehicle

Supervisor

€16.8 billion paid +
€24 billion in shortterm and €16.1 billion
in long-term loans
assumed
92.6% of Fortis Bank
Nederland Holding,
100% interest in Fortis
Insurance Netherlands
N.V., 100% interest in
Fortis Corporate
Insurance, and 70%
interest in Fortis FBN
(H) Preferred. In
December 2008,
acquired a 33.8%
interest in the ABN
AMRO assets held by
the Fortis Group for an
additional €6.54 billion.
N/A

De Nederlandsche Bank

Source: Reuters.

Belgium

Luxembourg

Fortis Group

€4.7 billion + €4.7
billion additional

€2.5 billion

N/A

Additional shares of
Fortis Banque
Belgium, bringing its
total interest to
99.93%, 75% of
which was to be sold
to BNP Paribas for
€8.5 billion. As a
result, Belgium
became Paribas’s
largest shareholder
(9.83% of capital and
12% of votes). Shares
of Luxembourg bank.

€8.25 billion
(payable in
shares)

49% of
Luxembourg
banking
subsidiary to be
sold to BNP
Paribas. Retains
33%, blocking
shareholder
vote.
Luxembourg
became a 1.1%
shareholder of
BNP Paribas.

75% of Belgian
government
interests in the
Belgian bank
and 66% of the
Luxembourg
bank. Would
also acquire
the Belgian
insurance
activities of
Fortis Group.

Retains Fortis
Insurance
International.
Would also
benefit from
the sale of the
Dutch and
Belgian
insurance
companies.

N/A

€1 billion
(10%)

€6.7 billion
(66%)

Central Bank of
Luxembourg

Autorité de
Contrôle
Prudentiel et
de Résolution

€2.4 billion
(24%)

Belgian Banking,
Finance and
Insurance
Commission

Key changes in the deal were:
•
•
•
•

BNP Paribas
(France)

De
Nederlandsche
Bank, Belgian
Banking,
Finance and
Insurance
Commission

BNP Paribas increased its price to €11.2 billion.
Belgium would retain a 25% blocking vote in Fortis Belgium.
Rather than acquire all of Belgium insurance business, Belgium acquired only 25%.
A redistribution of the cost of the Special Purpose Vehicle, now valued at €11.8 billion,
o 11.76% (€1.39) share by BNP Paribas,
o 43.53% (€5.13) by the Belgian government, and
o 44.71% (€5.28) by Fortis Group (BNP Paribas 2009).

EU State Aid Redux
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In its December ruling, discussed above, the European Commission determined that the
purchase of Fortis Insurance Nederland N.V. by the Dutch government did not constitute
state aid. On April 9, 2009, the Commission opened a formal investigation into the question
of state aid regarding the original nationalization of the Dutch bank, the subsequent
purchase of the Dutch ABN AMRO banking assets (ABN AMRO Bank N.V.), the provision of
tens of billions of euro in financing, and the plans of the government to merge the banks into
a new entity (European Commission, IP/09/565).

On February 8, 2010, the Commission temporarily approved the Dutch plans to merge the
two banks as “urgent rescue aid,” while it continued to investigate the overall Dutch activities
(European Commission, IP/10/138). In July 2010, the Dutch bank operations were merged
to create the current ABN AMRO Group N.V.

On April 5, 2011, the Commission finally approved all Dutch support activities as being “in
line with EU rules that allow aid to remedy a serious disturbance in a member state’s
economy” (European Commission, IP/11/406). As of October 2014, the Dutch government
still owned ABN AMRO Group, which is an operating commercial bank, one with $533 billion
in assets (SNL Financial). The government has indicated intent to sell the company to private
investors sometime in the future.
Meanwhile, the Fortis insurance operations (previously Fortis Holding) were not purchased
by BNP Paribas but were renamed Ageas in 2010 and continue to operate out of their
Brussels headquarters.

BNP Paribas remains one of the largest banks in the world and survived the financial crisis
fairly well, delivering profit of €3 billion in 2008 and €5.8 billion in 2009. It was ranked 4th
overall on SNL Financial’s list of the world’s 100 largest banks with $2.512 trillion in assets
(December 2013) (SNL Financial).

7. Lessons Learned

In March 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a committee of the Bank for
International Settlements, issued Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank
Resolution Group that included an analysis of the Fortis, Dexia (Belgium), Kaupthing
(Iceland), and Lehman Brothers (US) resolutions. The report highlighted the shortcomings
of the cross-border crisis resolution frameworks among the European member states and
cited “group structure, liquidity and information sharing among supervisors as examples
where improvements are needed” (Basel Committee 2010, 10).
Specifically, with respect to the Fortis resolution the Committee made the following findings:
•

•

The Fortis case illustrates the tension between the cross-border nature of a group and
the domestic focus of national frameworks and responsibilities for crisis
management. This leads to a solution along national lines, which did not involve
intervention through statutory resolution mechanisms;

The usefulness of formal supervisory crisis management tools appears to be limited
in a situation where the institution needs to be stabilized rapidly and, at the same
time, the continuity of business needs to be ensured in more than one jurisdiction.
For example, some formal tools, when disclosed, can further undermine market
confidence or may trigger termination and close-out netting events in financial
contracts, with counterproductive effects;
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The Fortis case illustrates the tension between the need to maintain financial
stability, for which a bank, under certain circumstances, needs to be resolved in the
public interest and with public support, and the position of the shareholders of such
a bank (i.e. dilution of their stake). Currently, Dutch and Belgian financial supervisory
legislation does not permit effective special measures to be taken to resolve
individual banks in a manner which maintains financial stability in urgent situations
and which overrides the rights of shareholders;
Despite a long-standing relationship in ongoing supervision and information sharing,
the Dutch and Belgian supervisory authorities assessed the situation differently.
Differences in the assessment of available information and the sense of urgency
complicated the resolution (Ibid., 11).

The Committee’s recommendations informed the recent changes in EU bank supervision and
resolution laws. These include EU-level supervision and resolution of significant crossborder banks such as Fortis Group, utilizing a single rulebook of regulations and a uniform
set of resolution tools, and increased cross-border cooperation and information sharing.
It cannot be known what impact the new EU banking regulations would have had on Fortis’s
situation. However, it seems likely that Fortis would have been designated a significant bank
under the new Single Supervisory Mechanism, subject to direct supervision by the European
Central Bank (working closely with the National Supervisory Authorities of its host’s
countries). Since under the new regime there is a mandate to consider systemic risk issues,
perhaps the ECB might not have approved the ABN AMRO deal in late 2007, or may have at
least delayed it.

If the merger had been approved, the rescue and resolution of Fortis might have gone
differently under the Single Resolution Mechanism, with the original plan being adhered to
and funded through the ECB, not subject to the whims of individual countries. At least, there
would have been a mechanism in place to ensure that all interested parties were invited to
any “war council,” so that, from the beginning, an arguably more collaborative and fairer
process would have been employed.

163

European Banking Union C

Wiggins et al.

References
Algemene Rekenkamer, The Financial Crisis 2008-2009, Policy and Communications
Department, Communications Division, Netherlands Court of Audit Report.

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Bank for International Settlements), Report and
Recommendations of Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group, March 2010.
Belgium Government, News-Portal, Fortis:
www.belgium.be, October 5, 2008.

Additional

Measures,

available

Blenkinsop, Philip, Belgian government collapses over Fortis affair, Reuters, Dec 19, 2008.

at

BNP Paribas, Consolidated Financial Statements at 31 December 2009.

De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. (Dr. A.H.E.M. Wellink), Letter to Minister of Finance dated 17
September 2007 (Recommendation on Fortis acquisition of ABN AMRO) (Unofficial
Translation). (DCB Fortis Letter)

__________, Letter to Minister of Finance (Mr. Bos) dated 17 September 2007 (Financial
Stability Analysis of ABN AMRO acquisition) (Unofficial Translation).

__________, (No Signature), Letter to Minister of Finance dated 17 September 2007
(Recommendation on Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander acquisition of
ABN AMRO) (Unofficial Translation). (DCB RBS/Santander Letter)

European Commission, Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
Firms in Difficulty, Official Journal of the European Union C 244/2, (2004/c 244/02)
01.10.2004, pages 2-17.

__________, Mergers: Commission approves proposed acquisition of ABN AMRO assets by
Fortis, subject to conditions, IP/07/1442, 3 October 2007.
__________, State aid: Commission Approves Belgian state guarantee for Fortis Bank,
IP/08/1746, November 2, 2008.

__________, State Aid: Commission approves restructuring of ABN AMRO Group, subject to
conditions, IP/11/406 (05/04/2011).
__________, State aid: Commission clears state aid to rescue and restructure Fortis Bank and
Fortis Bank Luxembourg, IP/08/1884, December 3, 2008.

__________, State aid: Commission opens in-depth investigation into alleged aids to Fortis Bank
Nederland and Dutch activities of ABN AMRO, IP/09/565 (08/04/2009).
__________, State aid: Commission temporarily approves additional recapitalisation package in
favour of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank Nederland, IP/10/138 (08/02/2010).

__________, State aid: The Netherlands C11|09 (related to NN2/10(ex N429/09) and N
19/10)—Recapitalisation measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO Group,
Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU (2010/C 95/07),
Official Journal of the European Union C95/10, 15.4.2010.
164

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 1 Iss. 3

De Standaard, Bos wou Fortis Nederland voor de zomer al kopen, 10/12/2008 (Translated).
Fortis Group, Fortis Financial Statements 2006, Fortis Consolidated Financial Statements.
__________, Fortis Governance Statement, 25 January 2008.

Fortis, RBS and Santander, Proposed Offer for ABN AMRO of €38.40 per ABN AMRO Share,
PRESS RELEASE, OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED OFFER (29 May 2007). (DCB Press
Release)

Fortune
Global
500
(2005-2008)
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/snapshots/532.html.
Jones, Claire, Interview: Peter Praet, Central Banking 20.4 (May 2010): 27-31.

HeraldScotland, FSA attacked over RBS’s takeover of ABM Amro, 19 October 2012
The New York Times, Dutch Government nationalizes Fortis’s operations in the Netherlands.
October 3, 2008.
__________, “Fortis scraps dividend and plans to raise $8 billion,” June 26, 2008 (NY Times
2008A).

Reuters, Text-S&P release on Fortis Group entities, July 17, 2008.
The Royal Bank of Scotland, www.rbs.com.

SNL Financial, Data Dispatch, Largest 100 banks in the world (Monday, December 23, 2013
11:17 AM ET) available at https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A26316576-11566 retrieved July 1, 2014.
Treanor, Jill, Dutch Central bank opposes ABN Carve-up, The Guardian, 18 April 2007.

Wiggins, Rosalind Z., Michael Wedow, and Andrew Metrick. 2014A. European Banking Union
A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
2014- 4A-V1, December.
__________, Michael Wedow, and Andrew Metrick. 2014B. European Banking Union B: The
Single Resolution Mechanism, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 20144B-V1, December.

__________, Natalia Tente, and Andrew Metrick. 2014C. European Banking Union C: CrossBorder Resolution—Fortis Group, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
2014-4C-V1, December.
__________, and Andrew Metrick. 2014H. The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global
Contagion, Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014-3H-V1, December.

Wilson, Amy, Financial crisis: Benelux bank Fortis nationalised to stop collapse, The
Telegraph, 29 September 2008.

165

European Banking Union C

Wiggins et al.

Development of this case has been supported by a generous grant from the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation to the Yale Program on Financial Stability.
Copyright 2014, 2015, 2019 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

166

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 1 Iss. 3

Appendix A: DCB’s analysis of systemic risk.
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